China is trying to shut down Taiwan’s internet
As the United States watched the skies after the spy balloon incident, China could operate at sea. In early February, naval vessels disconnected two underwater cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, a small archipelago just 10 nautical miles off the coast of China, to the Internet. Islanders are now facing severe cuts to internet access until the cables are repaired. The move appears to be a targeted aggression by Beijing, or an exercise to cut off all of Taiwan.
A Chinese fishing boat sails near the Matsu Islands on February 2 cut off one of two cables connecting the islands to Taiwan. Then six days later, a Chinese truck cut the second cable. Speaking shortly after the second cable was cut, Wong Po-chung, vice chairman of Taiwan’s National Communications Commission; told Journalists say that the incidents were intentional. It’s not uncommon for submarine cables to be damaged, but losing two in a row is either truly unfortunate or possibly not a coincidence. In any case, Matsu Islanders are now left with only basic internet access; the islands’ commercial telecommunications provider, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT) has. create free, 24-hour Wi-Fi in its stores on the islands and launched a backup microwave system for phone calls and government communications.
About 12,700 residents of the Matsu Islands will have to live without cables for many more weeks. the repair ship will arrive on April 20th at the latest, and additional time will be required for repairs. Residents have experience living with damaged underwater cables. CHT: reports that the cables were damaged five times in 2021 and four times last year, although not as badly as this time. During such periods of internet disruption, “it will take more than 10 minutes to send a text message and longer to send a picture,” said Lee Wen, head of the Matsu Islands of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). told that Taipei Timesadding that “the reservation system for hostels and logistics services also cannot function normally, not to mention watching content and movies on social networks.”
As the United States watched the skies after the spy balloon incident, China could operate at sea. In early February, naval vessels disconnected two underwater cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, a small archipelago just 10 nautical miles off the coast of China, to the Internet. Islanders are now facing severe cuts to internet access until the cables are repaired. The move appears to be a targeted aggression by Beijing, or an exercise to cut off all of Taiwan.
A Chinese fishing boat sails near the Matsu Islands on February 2 cut off one of two cables connecting the islands to Taiwan. Then six days later, a Chinese truck cut the second cable. Speaking shortly after the second cable was cut, Wong Po-chung, vice chairman of Taiwan’s National Communications Commission; told Journalists say that the incidents were intentional. It’s not uncommon for submarine cables to be damaged, but losing two in a row is either truly unfortunate or possibly not a coincidence. In any case, Matsu Islanders are now left with only basic internet access; the islands’ commercial telecommunications provider, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT) has. create free, 24-hour Wi-Fi in its stores on the islands and launched a backup microwave system for phone calls and government communications.
About 12,700 residents of the Matsu Islands will have to live without cables for many more weeks. the repair ship will arrive on April 20th at the latest, and additional time will be required for repairs. Residents have experience living with damaged underwater cables. CHT: reports that the cables were damaged five times in 2021 and four times last year, although not as badly as this time. During such periods of internet disruption, “it will take more than 10 minutes to send a text message and longer to send a picture,” said Lee Wen, head of the Matsu Islands of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). told that Taipei Timesadding that “the reservation system for hostels and logistics services also cannot function normally, not to mention watching content and movies on social networks.”
With both cables, even moderately slowed down Internet makes everyday life stand still. Beijing is watching to see how the islanders overcome this obstacle to their existence, and to see how they manage to communicate with Taiwan proper. It also closely monitors military surveillance of what it considers a renegade region. Taiwan’s offshore islands have always been its Achilles heel. In 1958, China shelled the Matsu Islands and neighboring Kinmen Island. Last summer, the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted major exercises near the island, ostensibly in response to then-US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, though their large and well-executed nature suggested they had been planned long ago.
Indeed, it is surprising how often Chinese ships have damaged the submarine cables connecting the islands in recent years. It’s especially amazing because it’s no mystery where the world is 380 submarine cables are located. On the contrary, there are maps detailing their location to ensure that fishing vessels do not accidentally damage them while dragging their nets. By and large this works. international cable protection committee reports that there are between 100 and 200 cases of cable damage each year, and only 50-100 of these cases involve fishing vessels; the rest are the result of construction and other activities. Incidents of damage to the cables connecting the Matsu Islands are, in other words, disproportionately frequent.
Moreover, to this day they have mostly involved Chinese excavators parked near the islands and digging sand (which I wrote about Foreign Policy last year). Given that submarine cables have a diam 17-21 millimeters (about the size of a garden hose), it would take an incredible amount of luck to accidentally damage them as often as the Chinese ships do, let alone take out two in a row.
Chinese excavators stationed in Taiwanese waters and taking Taiwanese sand is classic gray zone aggression; it’s not a military attack, but it’s also nothing. Indeed, every time they appear, Taiwan Coast Guard vessels must go to the site and order the ships to leave (although they can’t be sure that the uninvited visitors will do so quickly). Every time, the diggers harm the marine fauna and the seabed. And because they often damage underwater cables in the process, they harm the Matsu Islands’ ability to function and communicate with Taiwan and the wider world.
Given that the locations of the submarine cables are known, the frequent and now aggravated damage to the Matsu Islands is no accident; it looks like an invasion of Taiwan. After the last incident, PDP the accused China deliberately damaged the cables given how often they break. The incidents may even be an exercise in preparation for Taiwan’s corresponding communications shutdown. Fifteen submarine cables connect the main island with global telecommunications.
The CHT plans to provide at least a partial connection to the Matsu Islands putting another cable, and this time it will be buried under the seabed. However, the cable will only be operational until 2025. Meanwhile, CHT has to pay for a back-up internet system and is also waiving islanders’ internet fees. When the repair ship arrives, the fixing of the two cables will take place value CHT 660,000 to $1.3 million.
Incurring such costs is also part of gray zone aggression. If the company suffers losses as a result of geopolitical aggression, its insurer may not cover it. Russia’s devastating NotPetya cyber attack has caused in mass litigation between multinational companies and their insurers. While CHT’s discussions with its underwriter are naturally confidential, the two must agree on whether the cable break is accidental damage or a damage operation initiated by another government to weaken Taiwan. In any event, CHT or its insurer must pay for double the damage, which is far beyond what is typical of submarine cables. What if CHT refuses to provide a connection to the Matsu Islands on the grounds that constant cable repairs make it too difficult and expensive? As I have outlined elsewhere and this reportgeopolitical confrontation threatens to make parts of global business uninsurable.
And there is another problem facing the CHT, Taiwan, and indeed all countries. lack of cable ships. The reason CHT has to wait until late April or later for repairs to begin is because there are only 60 cable trays around. (Look at them here.) It’s a good thing these poor-looking ships exist; indeed, the internet would not function without them. But cable ships are not only few in number, they are also advancing years later. As Dan Swinhoe reports for DCD magazine, no new cable vessels were delivered between 2004 and 2010, and only five vessels were delivered between 2011 and 2020. 19 are over 30 years old, and one is over 50,” says Swinho. Like the world’s undersea cables, cable ships are privately owned and the market, so far, doesn’t seem interested in improving things. This could be an opportunity for governments, especially the world’s dominant naval powers like the United States. Alternatively, cable operators, which include not only telcos but also tech giants like Google, may want to buy their own. cable ships.
In the future, more submarine cables will be laid under the seabed to make them less likely to be damaged, but this also depends on the availability of 60 cable ships. If Chinese fishing and cargo ships want to accidentally damage or cut the 15 undersea cables that connect Taiwan to the rest of the world, the near future thus offers tantalizing prospects. Indeed, given the world’s dependence on cables and the few ships that can service them, the near future offers the tantalizing prospect of creating a few more “accidents” at sea for any country.
Cable sabotage may become the blockade of our age, and unlike the blockades of past generations, it can be carried out with cunning. Not surprisingly, other telecom operators are looking into CHT’s backup operations, as they too may have to implement similar measures in Taiwan and beyond. And hopefully many countries will study Taiwan’s response. Responding to a devastating but invisible blockade could become one of the most difficult diplomatic challenges facing Western governments.
